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Norm Conflicts in Global Health: The Case of Indonesia 
and Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
 
Una Jakob 
ABSTRACT 
The current Covid-19 pandemic highlights the importance of international cooperation in 
the prevention and containment of infectious diseases. This is true for all pathogens with 
pandemic potential, including certain influenza viruses, which is why the World Health Or-
ganisation (WHO) has maintained a system for monitoring and sharing influenza viruses 
for decades. In 2007, Indonesia rescinded its cooperation in this system even though ex-
perts ascribed a crucial role to Indonesian virus samples in the prevention of a flu pan-
demic; such a pandemic was at the time feared to be imminent. Indonesia’s policy was 
nurtured inter alia by a growing frustration with inequalities in the existing system in which 
industrialised countries as well as drug and vaccine producers benefitted from samples 
provided by countries of the Global South but did not share these benefits adequately with 
those countries. The new “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework”, concluded in 
2011, established benefit-sharing and virus-sharing as principles on an equal footing. It 
thus reformed the WHO process but also brought to the fore existing tensions and conflicts 
between various norms and practices: global health cooperation (which requires the shar-
ing of pathogen samples), the protection of intellectual property rights (which is intended 
to promote innovation and ensure profits), and the protection of genetic resources (which 
considers pathogens as national resources and requires adequate benefit-sharing in their 
exploitation). This Working Paper traces Indonesia’s policy regarding pandemic influenza 
preparedness and the reform process within WHO. Moreover, it presents the interlinkages 
between said norm complexes, which are exacerbated by technological developments in 
genetic sequencing, as areas that would merit further theoretical and empirical research. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die aktuelle Covid-19-Pandemie demonstriert eindrücklich die große Bedeutung internatio-
naler Zusammenarbeit bei der Vorbeugung und Eindämmung von weltweiten Krankheits-
ausbrüchen. Dies gilt für alle Erreger, die Pandemien hervorrufen können – einschließlich 
bestimmter Varianten des Influenzavirus. Deshalb unterhält die Weltgesundheitsorganisa-
tion (WHO) seit Jahrzehnten ein Netzwerk, innerhalb dessen Influenzaviren beobachtet und 
zu Forschungszwecken weitergegeben werden. 2007 kündigte Indonesien seine Mitwir-
kung in diesem System auf, obwohl indonesische Virenproben als wesentlich für die Ab-
wendung einer befürchteten Grippe-Pandemie galten. Dahinter stand unter anderem eine 
wachsende Frustration mit Ungleichheiten innerhalb des Netzwerks, in dem Industrieländer 
und große Pharmakonzerne von Virenproben aus Ländern des Globalen Südens profitier-
ten, ohne dass letztere an den Profiten angemessen beteiligt wurden. Der 2011 vereinbarte 
„Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework“ (PIP Framework), der „benefit-sharing“ als 
gleichberechtigtes Element neben „virus-sharing“ etablierte, reformierte zwar die internati-
onale Grippebekämpfung, verschärfte aber auch bestehende Spannungen und Konflikte 
zwischen verschiedenen Normen und Praktiken: der globalen Gesundheitszusammenar-
beit (die den Austausch von Erregerproben erfordert), dem Schutz geistigen Eigentums (der 
Innovation fördern und Profite sichern soll) sowie dem Schutz genetischer Ressourcen (der 
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Erreger als nationales Ressource betrachtet und bei ihrer Ausbeutung angemessene Profit-
Beteiligung fordert). Dieses Working Paper zeichnet Indonesiens Politik zur Grippe-Pande-
mievorbeugung und den Reformprozess innerhalb der WHO nach. Es markiert außerdem 
die genannten Normkomplexe sowie die Rolle technologischer Neuerungen in der Gense-
quenzierung darin als künftige empirische und theoretische Forschungsfelder. 
 
Addendum 
Sometimes research papers are being overtaken by real-life events. By the time this Working 
Paper went into the editing process, SARS-CoV2 had only just begun to spread outside China. 
At the time of publication, the WHO had declared the outbreak a pandemic and the virus had 
spread all over the world. These developments emphasise how important international 
health preparedness and cooperation are, and how right those experts were who warned that 
a pandemic might occur at any time. Influenza used to be considered the most likely causa-
tive pathogen and was hence at the centre of international pandemic preparedness efforts 
(and of this paper). In light of the current events, this may well change. Now is the time for 
emergency response. But the time will come for considering lessons learned, both practically 
and academically. It will then also be possible to analyse whether and how the norm conflicts 
that have emerged over pandemic influenza preparedness, as outlined in this Working Paper, 
have played out in the Covid-19 pandemic as well and what implications this might have. 
 
Manchmal werden wissenschaftliche Texte von realen Ereignissen überholt. Als dieses Ar-
beitspapier in die redaktionelle Bearbeitung ging, hatte SARS-CoV2 gerade erst begonnen, 
sich außerhalb Chinas zu verbreiten. Zum Zeitpunkt der Veröffentlichung hatte die WHO den 
Ausbruch bereits zur Pandemie erklärt, und das Virus hat sich auf der ganzen Welt verbreitet. 
Diese Entwicklungen unterstreichen, wie wichtig die internationale Gesundheitsvorsorge und 
-zusammenarbeit sind und wie recht diejenigen Expertinnen und Experten hatten, die davor 
warnten, eine Pandemie könne jederzeit auftreten. Influenzaviren galten bislang als wahr-
scheinlichste Auslöser und standen daher im Zentrum der internationalen Pandemiepräven-
tion (und dieses Papiers). Angesichts der aktuellen Entwicklungen dürfte sich das ändern. 
Jetzt ist zunächst die Zeit für Krisenreaktion. Aber die Zeit wird kommen, in der Lehren aus 
dem Geschehen gezogen werden können, sowohl aus praktischer als auch aus akademi-
scher Perspektive. Dann kann auch untersucht werden, ob und, wenn ja, wie sich die hier 
beschriebenen Normenkonflikte um die Grippe-Pandemieprävention auch in der Covid-19-
Pandemie niedergeschlagen haben und was daraus zu folgern ist. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION1 
The emergence of a novel Corona virus (SARS-CoV-2) – which has been spreading rapidly 
all over the world – highlights the importance of international cooperation and the timely 
                                                             
1  This paper presents a revised and updated version of a case study (Becker-Jakob 2014) prepared for the PRIF 
research project “"Rogue States", "Outlaws", and "Pariahs": Dissidence Between Delegitimization and Justifi-
cation”, directed by Klaus-Dieter Wolf and funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) 
(https://www.hsfk.de/en/research/projects/rogue-states-outlaws-and-pariahs-dissidence-between-delegiti-
mization-and-justification/, 12.12.2019). See also Gertheiss et al. 2017. The author is grateful to Melanie Coni-
Zimmer for very helpful and constructive comments on a draft version of this paper. 
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sharing of relevant information for global health preparedness and the containment of pan-
demics. The fact that Chinese scientists quickly sequenced the genome of SARS-CoV-2 
and shared pertinent information publicly has allowed experts elsewhere to carry out im-
portant research on their own (see e.g. Cohen 2020; Yong 2020).  
Just like Corona viruses, influenza viruses can harbour pandemic potential, as proven by 
the Spanish Flu in 1918/1919, the Hongkong Flu in 1969, or the swine flu pandemic in 2009 
(see Fineberg 2014).2 Experts estimate that influenza pandemics are likely to occur at least 
two to three times per century. Preventing such pandemics is high on the list of priorities 
in global health policy (see e.g. WHO 2016; WHO 2019a). In the early 2000s, a series of 
serious outbreaks of avian influenza occurred in South East Asia, and experts feared that 
these might develop into a flu pandemic. These concerns notwithstanding, Indonesia in 
2007 unilaterally abandoned the decades-old global practice of sharing flu virus samples 
with other countries and the World Health Organisation (WHO), and demanded a far-reach-
ing reform of the existing cooperation in influenza preparedness. Indonesia’s policy com-
pelled the reluctant countries of the Global North to enter negotiations on a new normative 
and operational framework in which viruses as well as the benefits arising from their use 
in research and industry would now be shared on an equal footing. These negotiations 
resulted in the 2011 Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework (PIP Framework). The 
process never left established international institutions, namely the WHO, and Indonesia 
mostly employed traditional negotiation tactics. However, the circumstances under which 
these events took place – including the tangible risk of a global health crisis – rendered 
Indonesia’s policy a remarkable act of dissidence in international politics (see Gertheiss et 
al. 2017). 
This policy altered the practice of influenza virus-sharing and established benefit-sharing 
as a new principle in this policy field. The process and discourse it triggered have tied in 
with normative developments outside the realm of global health, such as access and ben-
efit-sharing under the Convention of Biodiversity (CBD), intellectual property rights, and the 
protection of genetic resources. The ensuing conflicts between countries of the Global 
North and South, in turn, have strong implications for virus-sharing and influenza prepared-
ness: Origin countries of virus samples, often located in the Global South, have long de-
manded a fair share of the benefits accruing from the commercial use of samples gathered 
on their territories; at the same time, Northern countries and companies have referred to 
intellectual property rights to protect their products and gains. The protection of genetic 
resources, as codified in the 2010 Nagoya Protocol to the CBD, is now widely being inter-
preted to include pathogens as genetic resources. In fact, Indonesia’s claim to ‘viral sover-
eignty’ during the PIP Framework negotiations arguably helped pave the way for this inter-
pretation.3 This claim, however, can easily conflict with the requirements of rapid and free 
pathogen-sharing for global health preparedness and response, especially in global health 
crises (see e.g. Halabi 2019; Srinivas 2017; WHO 2016). 
This Working Paper first describes the history of pandemic influenza preparedness in the 
WHO. It then recounts the process that led to the renegotiation and reform of the existing 
system, portrays Indonesia’s role and strategy in this process and presents the arguments 
employed by its critics and supporters. In the subsequent section, the paper places these 
developments in the context of norm conflicts in the areas of global health, intellectual 
property rights, access and benefit sharing, and the protection of genetic resources. It 
                                                             
2  A pandemic is an outbreak of an infectious disease in several regions of the world at the same time, with the 
potential to spread all over the world. An epidemic is a regional outbreak. Pandemic influenza is distinct from 
the seasonal influenza outbreaks that occur annually.  
3  ‘Viral sovereignty’ represents the assertion that viruses isolated from a given territory are the property of the 
country of origin (Halabi 2019: 114; see also Hameiri 2014). 
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shows that the negotiations for the PIP Framework, though seemingly confined to a narrow 
issue area, are actually embedded in a much broader complex of political and normative 
tensions – a case in point being the conflict between the protection of genetic resources 
and ‘viral sovereignty’ on one hand, and the recognised need for the sharing of virus sam-
ples to prevent the spread of infectious diseases on the other. The Working Paper con-
cludes by outlining areas for future theoretical and policy-oriented research regarding 
these norm conflicts, the role of technological developments in genetic engineering in this 
policy field, and the implications for politics in other areas. 
2  THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS 
Ever since its foundation in 1946, the WHO has worked for the improvement of global 
health and the fight against infectious diseases. Based on these goals and on the WHO 
Constitution, a system of global health governance has emerged that includes various ini-
tiatives targeted at specific global health problems. Since the 1950s, one such initiative 
has been aimed at containing the effects of influenza outbreaks and at preventing the 
emergence of influenza pandemics. World health experts have repeatedly argued that one 
of the biggest threats to global health might emanate from a new influenza pandemic (see 
Elbe 2010: 479).4 Such pandemics occurred repeatedly throughout history. In the 20th cen-
tury, the Swine Flu in 2009, the Hong Kong Flu in 1969, the Asian Flu in 1957 and, most 
notoriously, the 1918 Spanish Flu claimed between several hundred thousand (2009) to 
over 50 million (1918) lives worldwide (see Saunders-Hastings/Krewski 2016; WHO 2019: 
2). Given the conditions in the modern globalised world, the accelerated and increased in-
ternational traffic in particular, future influenza pandemics could spread even more widely 
and rapidly than previous ones and could have severe public health, economic and security 
implications (see e.g. Saunders-Hastings/Krewski 2016; WHO 2019: 2). 
International cooperation in pandemic influenza prevention is necessary not only because 
infectious diseases do not respect borders. Specifics of the influenza virus make close 
cooperation all the more important. Flu viruses are endemic in almost all regions of the 
world. They are highly variable, which means they can change their genetic structure rela-
tively rapidly, and therefore require constant monitoring and regular adaptation of drugs 
and vaccines so that timely protection and remedies can be provided. In addition, the vi-
ruses can change their target groups: for instance, certain variants of the swine flu (H1N1) 
and bird flu (H5N1, H7N9) have jumped species and are now able to infect humans. De-
pending on the specific strains, the viruses can be easily transmitted and can be dangerous 
for humans, which renders them a great risk for world health and one of the priorities of 
global health surveillance and promotion (see WHO 2019). 
Since 1952, international cooperation in influenza preparedness has been institutionalised 
in the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) which was renamed Global Influ-
enza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) in 2011.5 GISRS currently comprises in-
stitutions in 115 WHO member states, including National Influenza Centres in all regions 
of the world, six WHO Collaborating Centres in Australia, China, Japan, the UK and the USA, 
as well as several Reference and Essential Regulatory Laboratories. The Centres and la-
boratories are all part of national government or research institutions. GISRS inter alia acts 
as monitor for detecting novel influenza viruses including those with pandemic potential, 
                                                             
4  For an analysis of the “securitization of H5N1” as a “pressing existential threat demanding an urgent and 
sustained international response” see Elbe 2010. 
5  On this and the following see https://www.who.int/influenza/gisrs_laboratory/en/ (02.02.2020). See also Al-
Tawfiq et al. 2014. 
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and it also provides data upon which the WHO issues its annual recommendations for the 
composition of the vaccines against seasonal flu. Vaccine manufacturers can then use the 
information generated through GISRS to develop seasonal flu vaccines, drugs and other 
products. 
For decades, the member states of GISN cooperated relatively smoothly within the network 
and with external partners, including vaccine manufacturers (see Kamradt-Scott/Lee 2011: 
834). Relevant virus strains were collected in their countries of origin and passed to “spe-
cialized laboratories of other states participating in GISN, for both diagnostic and risk-as-
sessment purposes, and to encourage the development of new vaccines for the subse-
quent influenza season” (Vezzani 2010: 677). Rules for the transfer of virus samples and 
regulations about passing these samples to third parties were under-developed until 2005, 
when the WHO issued guidelines for the sharing of pandemic influenza viruses. These 
guidelines posited that any transfer of virus samples to entities not participating in GISN 
would require the consent of the state of origin (Vezzani 2010: 677). Yet, the guidelines 
were not legally binding. Simone Vezzani describes the state of play in the mid-2000s as 
follows: 
“As a matter of fact, viruses are commonly transferred by GISN laboratories to drug 
companies, which use them to manufacture vaccines and other pharmaceuticals 
without assuming significant, if any, benefit-sharing obligations. In addition to this, 
it is not unusual for both GISN laboratories and third entities to make intellectual 
property rights (IPR) claims over products (genes and gene sequences, vaccines 
etc.) or medical technologies based on pathogen samples shared through the net-
work” (Vezzani 2010: 677).6 
These pathogen samples often stemmed from countries of the Global South, whereas the 
vaccine producers were mainly located in industrialized countries, and “[u]ntil quite re-
cently, interest in the [GISN, UJ] was generally limited to industrialized countries whose 
populations used seasonal vaccines” (WHO n.d.: 1). The annual adaptation of existing 
drugs and vaccines as well as the development of new ones benefitted greatly from the 
virus- and data-sharing practices established under GISN. At the same time, there had been 
longstanding and wide-spread discontent in the Global South with existing global struc-
tures of drug and vaccine accessibility and distribution, and with the exploitation of natural 
and genetic resources in general (Wolf/Scholz 2017; see also Elbe 2010: 480; Hammond 
2009). Nevertheless, GISN did not receive much public or professional attention (see Ham-
mond 2009).  
This changed drastically in the mid-2000s when experts became increasingly concerned 
about a possible new flu pandemic. Indonesia had been critical of GISN’s functioning and 
in particular the “high price of patented antiviral drugs […] produced by foreign pharmaceu-
tical companies” for some time (Vezzani 2010: 677). In 2007, it cancelled its cooperation 
in GISN and ceased to share the circulating virus strains which caused severe H5N1 out-
breaks in birds and humans in the region. This step provoked strong criticism and caused 
intense debates within the WHO system. However, the Indonesian withdrawal from GISN 
also resulted in a negotiation process for a reformed international framework for influenza 
preparedness, and in the 2011 PIP Framework. Moreover, through Indonesia’s argumenta-
tion and actions, virus-sharing became intertwined with other regimes such as access and 
benefit-sharing, intellectual property rights, and the protection of genetic resources.  
                                                             
6  In sharper words, Edward Hammond characterized GISN as “global virus vacuum” which, in the guise of inter-
national global health cooperation under WHO aegis, mainly served the Northern pharmaceutical industry 
(Hammond 2009). 
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3  THE CRISIS OF INFLUENZA VIRUS-SHARING 
3.1  The Role of Indonesia  
In the mid-2000s, worries increased that a new influenza pandemic might be imminent due 
to severe outbreaks of bird flu, caused by a highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza strain, in 
several Southeast Asian countries (Elbe 2010: 477). Millions of birds were infected and 
had to be culled, and these countries also recorded unusually high infection and casualty 
rates among humans. The WHO assessed the situation at the time as very serious:  
“Of all the avian influenza viruses, which normally cause infection in birds and pigs 
only, the H5N1 strain may have a unique capacity to cause severe disease, with 
high mortality, in humans.”7 
While transmission was seen only from birds to humans, fears existed that the H5N1 virus 
could mutate to enable human-to-human transmission. In this case, experts estimated that 
millions of people worldwide could be affected by a pandemic. Prior to 2007, Indonesia 
had provided H5N1 virus samples to several laboratories collaborating in GISN “for diag-
nostic confirmation and risk assessment purposes” in accordance with established prac-
tice (Hammond 2009; Sedyaningsih et al. 2008: 482).8 Stockpiling and distribution of suf-
ficient doses of drugs and vaccines is one of the crucial elements of pandemic prepared-
ness, and depends on the availability of circulating virus strains (Fidler 2008: 88). The acute 
fear of a human bird flu pandemic greatly increased the demand for drug and vaccine 
stockpiles especially in industrialized countries, even though these countries had not yet 
been affected by outbreaks (see Elbe 2010: 477, 480; Hammond 2009). In 2005, Indonesia 
had been unable to purchase stocks of a crucial antiviral drug, as “rich countries had al-
ready locked up the supply” (Hammond 2009; see also Elbe 2010: 480–481). The limited 
production capacities were moreover located almost exclusively in the North at the time 
(see Irwin 2010). All this fostered fears in Jakarta that increased demand and rising prices 
might block developing countries’ access to the products they needed to contain their re-
gional outbreaks, and for which they had provided the essential viral resources (see Elbe 
2010: 480; Fidler 2008: 88; Sedyaningsih et al. 2008: 486). This was considered “unfair” by 
Indonesia, and “[i]n a global context, Indonesia can be understood as claiming that GISN 
was in violation of basic principles of distributive justice” (Krishnamurthy/Herder 2013: 
277).9 
Indonesia also complained that  
“results of laboratory analyses that involved H5N1 viruses from Indonesia were 
presented in various international meetings without prior permission nor notifica-
tion to the Indonesian government nor its scientists, or with notifications just a 
couple of hours prior to the presentation, at best.” (Sedyaningsih et al. 2008: 485).  
Indonesian government representatives considered these and other related incidents as 
“unethical practices” that “violated the WHO guidance for the timely sharing of influenza 
viruses/specimens [...]” (Sedyaningsih et al. 2008: 485).10 Moreover, towards the end of 
                                                             
7  https://www.who.int/csr/don/2004_01_22/en/ (02.02.2020). 
8  For a detailed account of the H5N1 outbreak in Indonesia and the domestic response to it see Forster 2009. 
9  In an analysis from a justice perspective, Meena Krishnamurthy and Matthew Herder dissect the Indonesian 
normative claims to be based on the values of ownership (of viruses), contribution (to vaccine development 
and pandemic preparedness), and reciprocity (within GISN and beyond). They argue that if considered in com-
bination, they provide a convincing basis for the Indonesian claim of the injustices of GISN (Krishna-
murthy/Herder 2013: 277). 
10  The WHO guidance referred to in the quote is the WHO “Guidance for the timely sharing of influenza vi-
ruses/specimens with potential to cause human influenza pandemics”, March 2005. 
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2006 it became known that a pharmaceutical company outside GISN was manufacturing 
a vaccine based on the Indonesian H5N1 virus strain without having consulted with Indo-
nesia (Molenaar 2010: 44; Irwin 2010; Sedyaningsih et al. 2008: 486). The very fact that a 
random pharmaceutical company had access to the Indonesian strain without Indonesian 
consent – albeit not a new phenomenon (Vezzani 2010: 677) – was considered by Jakarta 
a “violation (again) of the WHO guidance for virus sharing” and “revealed the unfairness 
and inequities of the global system” (Sedyaningsih et al. 2008: 486). It further increased 
anger and concern at the fact that the product was too costly to be affordable in sufficient 
doses for Indonesia (Vezzani 2010: 677–678), especially given the fact that several South 
East Asian countries were already facing a public health emergency situation due to the 
regional H5N1 outbreak. 
In reaction to these developments, Indonesia refused to share H5N1 virus samples from 
January 2007 onwards, thus rescinding its cooperation in GISN.11 Government represent-
atives later described their own action as “drastic” and “inevitable” and cited a “breakdown 
of trust in the existing WHO GISN and a lack of benefits accruing to developing countries 
such as Indonesia” as major reasons for its controversial decision (Sedyaningsih et al. 
2008: 486).12 
“Indonesia’s action alarmed the global health community. Indonesia has been hit 
hard by avian influenza, so its cooperation in tracking the influenza virus (H5N1) 
was critical. Without access to Indonesia’s influenza strains, global surveillance 
was jeopardized [...]” (Fidler 2010: 88; see also Elbe 2010: 479; Irwin 2010). 
Indonesia connected its withdrawal from GISN with demands for the negotiation of  
“a new transparent, fair and equitable, international mechanism in virus sharing, 
aimed at ensuring fair and equitable access to H5N1 vaccines and other resulting 
benefits, taking into account the needs of developing countries” (Sedyaningsih et 
al. 2008: 486). 
It did not call into question the basic principle that states should cooperate in pandemic 
preparedness, but criticized “the unfairness and inequities of the global system” 
(Sedyaningsih et al. 2008: 486, 487; Vezzani 2010: 677). Jakarta countered the existing 
cooperation principle with the principle of states’ responsibility for national public health. 
It also stressed that current virus-sharing practice rested on “responsibilities of developing 
countries” [to share virus samples, UJ], leaving a big hole in the ‘rights’ of these nations” 
(Sedyaningsih et al. 2008: 486).  
The call for combining virus-sharing with benefit-sharing added a new element to the WHO 
discussions on pandemic preparedness (Fidler 2008: 89). It mirrored developments in 
other forums, notably the TRIPS Agreement with the 2001 Doha Declaration, which placed 
the right to health over intellectual property rights, and the CBD with its ongoing negotia-
tions for a benefit-sharing protocol (the 2010 Nagoya Protocol).13 Indonesia supported its 
position with references to the CBD; it claimed that vaccine producers and Northern coun-
tries violated the CBD principle of ensuring fair access to benefits arising from the use of 
                                                             
11  For a detailed description of the events from an Indonesian government perspective see Sedyaningsih et al. 
2008. 
12  Several researchers cite the domestic political situation and government of Indonesia of the time as one 
contributing factor to the specific, drastic course of action that Indonesia took in 2007 (Curley/Herington 
2010:156-160; Hameiri 2014; Irwin 2010). Paul Forster adds the personality of the health minister at the time 
as one crucial factor among others (Forster 2009). 
13  The linkages between these regimes are discussed in more detail in Section 5 of this Working Paper. 
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genetic resources (Kanth 2013: 15). Jakarta also invoked its right to exercise its sover-
eignty over genetic resources within its territory, as it saw codified in the CBD (see Fidler 
2008: 90; Sedyaningsih et al. 2008: 485; Vezzani 2010: 678). In fact, “Indonesia's actions 
introduced the previously unknown concept of ‘viral sovereignty’ to the scientific sharing 
process. ‘Viral sovereignty’ refers to situations in which countries assert that viruses lo-
cated and isolated from within their territories are their sovereign property” (Halabi 2019: 
114; see also Hameiri 2014). 
 
TRIPS 
Agree-
ment 
(1994) 
“Agreement on Trade-Re-
lated Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights” 
WTO agreement, negotiated 1986–94, introduced intel-
lectual property rights into world trade system; provides 
minimum standards of protection of intellectual property 
rights and of enforcement among WTO members; 
https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.htm. 
Doha Dec-
laration 
(2001) 
“Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health” 
Special Ministerial Declaration adopted by WTO mem-
bers in November 2001, addresses tension between pro-
tection of intellectual property rights and access of less-
developed countries to affordable medicines; encourages 
interpretation of TRIPS that supports states’ right to pro-
tect public health; https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm. 
CBD  
(1993) 
“Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity” 
3 main objectives: conservation of biological diversity; 
sustainable use of components of biological diversity; fair 
and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utili-
zation of genetic resources; entered into force on Decem-
ber 29, 1993; 196 parties as of February, 2020; 
https://www.cbd.int/. 
Nagoya 
Protocol 
(2010) 
“Nagoya Protocol on Ac-
cess to Genetic Re-
sources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Ben-
efits Arising From Their 
Utilization to the Conven-
tion on Biological Diver-
sity” 
Supplementary agreement to the CBD; provides legal 
framework for implementation of CBD objective regard-
ing access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing; re-
quires mutual consent in utilization of genetic resources 
and monetary or non-monetary benefit-sharing; entered 
into force on October 29, 2014, 123 parties as of Feb. 
2020; https://www.cbd.int/abs/. 
IHR  
(2005) 
“International Health 
Regulations” 
Purpose: “prevent, protect against, control and provide 
public health response to international spread of dis-
ease”; contains provisions inter alia concerning infor-
mation sharing, public health measures, national capac-
ity-building, travels and the transportation of goods, and 
recommendations for disease outbreaks and Public 
Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEIC), 
https://www.who.int/ihr/publica-
tions/9789241580496/en/. 
Table 1: Overview of international instruments relevant to pandemic influenza preparedness 
 
Indonesia’s refusal to continue sharing virus samples represented a drastic measure, es-
pecially given the perceived imminent risk of a human bird flu pandemic. As of 2010, Indo-
nesia was “the only country that has refused to share virus samples; other developing coun-
tries, even those that have supported Indonesia, share their samples without requiring ben-
efits in return” (Fidler 2010: 2). Jakarta’s actions moreover turned a “routine system of 
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functional public health cooperation” (GISN) into a “heavily politicised North-South issue” 
(Elbe 2010: 481). As Felicity Nelson states, “Indonesia’s actions in 2007 radically shifted 
the global mindset; in some countries, the climate of scientific openness gave way to na-
tionalism” (Nelson 2019), but she also emphasises that “Indonesia’s showdown with the 
WHO did more than just spur patriotic sentiment; it actually pushed the boundaries of in-
ternational law” (Nelson 2019). However, Indonesia called for the re-negotiation of a col-
lective virus- and benefit-sharing system, aimed to initiate this process through WHO pro-
cedures, and introduced concrete proposals as to how the WHO system could be restruc-
tured. The Indonesian initiative thus formally remained within the established WHO system 
and diplomatic discourse. 
3.2  Criticism directed at Indonesia’s Policy 
Indonesia’s role was especially relevant to international pandemic preparedness efforts 
because the Indonesian variant of H5N1 appeared to be particularly virulent and hence of 
a particular risk to global health (see Elbe 2010: 479). Detailed knowledge of and further 
research and development based on this virus strain was therefore considered crucial for 
an effective health response. This informed the negative reactions by many states to the 
Indonesian decision not to share virus samples anymore: 
“Many WHO Member States saw the Indonesian decision as undermining pan-
demic influenza surveillance and pandemic preparedness efforts, given that it im-
pedes the WHO Network’s ability to monitor mutations in the H5N1 virus in Indo-
nesia” (Molenaar 2010: 14; see also Hammond 2009) 
In the view of its critics, Indonesia’s refusal to share H5N1 virus samples jeopardized inter-
national efforts to prevent a potentially devastating flu pandemic. This made Indonesia’s 
position inacceptable and unjustifiable from their perspective. Even before the 2007 deci-
sion to stop sharing viruses, Indonesia had been criticised for not sharing critical genetic 
data about the H5N1 outbreak at all, or not widely enough, and for thus hindering efforts to 
prevent a human H5N1 pandemic (see Sedyaningsih et al. 2008: 485; Hammond 2009). 
After the 2007 decision, the USA and the EU accused Jakarta of violating the 2005 revised 
International Health Regulations (IHR) which in their interpretation included an obligation 
to share virus samples along with information about possible pandemic risks (Hammond 
2009; Fidler 2008: 91).14 Northern countries emphasised cooperation in the WHO system 
to improve global health as an overarching goal, and underlined member states’ responsi-
bility to support WHO efforts, including through providing virus samples (see Vezzani 2010: 
2010). Moreover, they claimed that by jeopardising global health security with its refusal to 
share H5N1 virus samples, Indonesia acted against the objective of the IHR, an action 
which “could be considered [a] violation of its duty not to defeat the object and purpose of 
2005 IHR before its entry into force [in 2007, UJ]” (Fidler 2008: 91). The refusal to share 
viruses with pandemic potential was thus seen as a violation of the spirit of the IHR, if not 
its letters (see Irwin 2010). Industrialised countries also questioned other legal arguments 
which Jakarta used to justify its position, namely the applicability of the CBD to pathogens 
as genetic resources (see Fidler 2008: 90–91; Vezzani 2010: 678–679). The relationship 
between the new pandemic influenza preparedness document and the CBD was intensely 
                                                             
14  The IHR, as revised in 2005, are binding on 196 countries who are parties to the agreement. The WHO plays 
a coordinating role in its implementation. The IHR contain provisions to build capacities in detecting and 
countering public health events, such as outbreaks of infectious diseases, and it obligates members to report 
on measures they have taken. They also represents a “framework for the coordination of the management of 
events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern” 
http://www.who.int/ihr/about/en/ (14.01.2014). 
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debated during the negotiations in Geneva (Molenaar 2011: 16; Molenaar 2011a: 5; Vezzani 
2010: 678). Meanwhile, the interlinkage of both has been recognised in the WHO system 
(see e.g. WHO 2016, WHO 2019b). The WHO itself reportedly tried to maintain the impres-
sion that virus-sharing was an obligation of WHO members, or was at least tantamount to 
it (Hammond 2009; Irwin 2010; Krishnamurty/Herder 2013: 275; see Fidler 2008: 91).  
Industrialised countries had fared well under the old GISN system, as they could exploit 
their privileged connections with and access to vaccine and anti-viral drug producers. 
Hence, they had no interest in promoting substantial changes to this system, especially not 
if those changes, as envisaged by Indonesia, would have resulted in a more equitable dis-
tribution of vaccines and drugs (see Elbe 2010: 483). Given the limited production capaci-
ties worldwide, this would very likely have meant a reduced supply available to them in the 
case of a flu pandemic. In the dispute about benefit-sharing and the distribution of vaccines 
and drugs, Indonesia’s critics therefore wished to see intellectual property rights main-
tained to avoid hampering or discouraging future innovations, and not to risk under-supply 
of vaccine and drug stockpiles (Molenaar 2010: 15; Molenaar 2011: 15; Molenaar 2011a: 
5; Vezzani 2010: 681). Indonesia’s criticism was addressed to both industrialised countries 
and the big (Northern) pharmaceutical companies. In the state-centric WHO system, it then 
developed into a conflict mainly between Southern and Northern countries (see Vezzani 
2010: 678, 681). 
3.3  Support for Indonesia’s Policy 
Indonesia quickly won the support of a number of developing countries, including Brazil, 
India and Thailand (Elbe 2010: 479; Molenaar 2010a: 4), and, in May 2008, of the Non-
Aligned Movement (Elbe 2010: 481). They shared Indonesia’s perception of structural 
weaknesses and injustices in GISN which prevented developing countries’ fair access to 
flu vaccines and antiviral drugs at reasonable cost, despite the crucial role of several of 
these countries in pandemic preparedness efforts (see Molenaar 2010a: 4; Sedyaningsih 
et al. 2008: 485, 487). They considered the existing system of vaccine development and 
distribution as “neither equitable nor transparent” (Irwin 2010).  
Indonesia and its supporters argued that developing countries were disadvantaged in 
terms of economy and health preparedness anyway, and the inequitable distribution prac-
tices under GISN further aggravated this, especially in a situation of acute pandemic con-
cerns. They drew on the principle of benefit-sharing in the use of genetic resources, which 
was under discussion at the time in the negotiations for the Nagoya Protocol (Irwin 2010). 
They interpreted this principle as also covering pathogens – a position that was contested 
at the time (see Fidler 2008: 90–91; Vezzani 2010: 678–679) – and wanted to connect 
virus-sharing directly with benefit-sharing, thus making the latter mandatory (Molenaar 
2010a: 3). In their view, the inequitable access to vaccines diminished incentives for devel-
oping countries to participate in virus- and information-sharing, since they had to bear the 
high costs for vaccines and treatments themselves, whereas pharmaceutical companies 
gained profits from their cooperation (Irwin 2010). Through establishing the link with ben-
efit-sharing, Indonesia and its supporters intended to secure the timely and affordable pro-
vision of public health care for their own populations in the case of flu outbreaks. 
For developing countries, the imperative of benefit-sharing for the sake of more equitable 
global and national health care trumped the need to uphold intellectual property rights in 
the strict sense, especially as these rights had already been modified in favour of global 
health through the 2001 Doha Declaration. Hence, they wished to see intellectual property 
rights abrogated, or materials and products developed as a result of cooperation under 
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GISN exempted, or at least to see adequate compensation provided (Hammond 2009; Vez-
zani 2010: 680–683). Indonesia in particular emphasised its sovereignty over any re-
sources collected on its territory, including pathogens (Fidler 2008: 90; Halabi 2019; Hame-
iri 2014; Vezzani 2010: 678). It rejected complaints that its refusal to share H5N1 samples 
represented a violation of the IHR, as in the Indonesian interpretation IHR obligations were 
limited to the sharing of relevant information, but not actual samples (see Fidler 2008: 92). 
4  THE NEW PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS FRAMEWORK 
4.1  The Negotiation Process, 2007–2011  
Despite these numerous conflicting normative and legal claims, no party to this dispute 
questioned the principle of international cooperation to promote global health. What was 
questioned, however, was the legitimacy of the existing system of pandemic influenza pre-
paredness. The conflict was articulated mainly within the WHO, through the work of inter-
governmental meetings convened by the Director-General and through the World Health 
Assembly (WHA) (WHO n.d). In Indonesia’s view, the negotiation process should result in 
a more equitable system of benefit-sharing in influenza preparedness. From the industrial-
ised countries’ perspective, it should ensure that an effective network of pandemic influ-
enza preparedness would be maintained that would not compromise their national health 
and commercial interests. As WHO member, Indonesia remained formally included in the 
proceedings as negotiation partner on an equal footing despite its withdrawal from GISN. 
Early on in the process, which comprised a series of meetings of varying groups of actors, 
Indonesia tabled concrete proposals as to how the WHO flu virus-sharing system could be 
re-structured to make it more equitable (Hammond 2009). At the same time, WHO officials 
and member states’ representatives tried to work out compromises that would reconcile 
the Indonesian call for institutionalised benefit-sharing and industrialised countries’ (and 
WHO’s) interest in uninhibited access to flu virus samples (Irwin 2010) and would induce 
Indonesia to resume sharing of H5N1 samples (Fidler/Gostin 2008: 171). These included 
offers to provide vaccine supplies (Elbe 2010: 482). However,  
“rather than simply accepting those offers of material support, and resolving the 
dispute there and then, the Indonesian health minister instead formulated a much 
stronger demand that made Indonesia’s resumption of virus sharing conditional 
upon a more fundamental reformation of the whole virus-sharing mechanism” 
(Elbe 2010: 482; see also Sedyaningsih et al. 2008: 486–487).  
Indeed, apart from a few samples sent to WHO laboratories in the course of 2007 and the 
release of genetic information, Indonesia remained reluctant to resume full cooperation in 
the form of virus-sharing at least until 2009 (Irwin 2010).  
Any potential discursive dominance of Northern states in the WHO forums was countered 
by the sheer number of supporters Indonesia could garner among developing countries 
(see e.g. Hammond 2009). Moreover, Indonesia’s repeated refusal to share viruses exerted 
strong pressure on industrialised countries to at least participate in the negotiation pro-
cess, since these countries had a great interest in the continuation of virus-sharing (see 
Elbe 2010: 477): Their governments found themselves under domestic public pressure to 
ensure preparedness for a potential pandemic – and preparedness, including sufficient 
vaccine stockpiles, depended on virus-sharing.  
The conflict gained additional urgency with the 2009 human swine flu (H1N1) pandemic, 
which occurred rather unexpectedly and demonstrated the need for effective pandemic 
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influenza preparedness.15 This outbreak also confirmed Indonesia’s and developing coun-
tries’ concerns about the inequitable nature of the current system, as developed countries 
stocked nearly all available vaccine doses, while – even after WHO and UN intervention and 
subsequent vaccine donations – developing countries were left with inadequate means to 
protect their populations against H1N1 (Fidler 2010: 1). This experience supported devel-
oping countries’ complaints about the inequitable and unjust nature of the current system 
(Fidler 2010: 2). However, it did not change the positions of other actors, in particular in-
dustrialized countries (Fidler 2010: 2); if anything, it cemented existing conflict lines as it 
proved to industrialized countries how they would have something to lose in a system that 
denied them preferential treatment, for instance by way of advance orders on vaccines 
(Fidler 2010: 2–3). 
Indonesia pursued its objectives through a mixture of more radical and more conventional 
strategies. Following the unprecedented and unparalleled withdrawal from GISN, it opted 
for a traditional negotiation process in the course of which it used its H5N1 samples as 
bargaining chips to further its objectives (Elbe 2010: 482).16 Since Indonesia itself was in-
terested in pandemic influenza preparedness cooperation, it did not aim to abolish any in-
ternational cooperation, but rather tried to use its leverage to add a strong benefit-sharing 
dimension to existing practices (see Vezzani 2010). With its emphasis on structural ine-
qualities and cross-references to related debates in other international forums, in particular 
the CBD, it gained the support of a large number of developing countries. The exploitation 
of genetic resources while access to pharmaceutical products was unevenly distributed, in 
combination with the unequitable public health care available in North and South (Steven-
son/Cooper 2009: 1387), apparently worked as strong mobilising arguments. Developing 
countries seem to have accepted the Indonesian strategy as legitimate, even though no 
other country followed its example to cease cooperation under GISN (Fidler 2010: 2). 
While Indonesia’s critics framed its actions as illegitimate, apparently they could not fully 
delegitimize Jakarta’s claim for a more equitable system of benefit-sharing. This is indi-
cated by the fact that talks and negotiations did not only commence within a few months 
after Indonesia’s withdrawal from GISN, but were also maintained despite difficult and 
tense discussions and were ultimately brought to a consensual compromise conclusion in 
May 2011.  
4.2  The PIP Framework: A New Norm of Sharing Viruses and Benefits? 
At the end of the 4-year negotiation process, WHO members agreed on a new Pandemic 
Influenza Preparedness Framework (PIP Framework).17  
“This Framework is an international agreement that brings together stakeholders 
from WHO Member States, industry and civil society with the goals of ensuring the 
sharing of influenza viruses with human pandemic potential through a WHO coor-
dinated network of public health laboratories, and the promotion of fair and equi-
table access to benefits, such as vaccines and antiviral drugs that arise from that 
sharing” (Gellin/Ampofo 2014). 
It includes innovations that largely correspond to Indonesia’s demands such as a more 
equitable distribution of access to vaccines and drugs. Moreover, it was agreed that pro-
ducers of vaccines, diagnostic equipment and drugs should make a financial contribution 
                                                             
15  Luckily, the H1N1 virus, though easily transmitted from humans to humans, did not cause as many casualties 
as some may have feared initially.  
16  For a detailed account of Indonesia’s actions during the negotiations see Irwin 2010. 
17  For WHO information on the PIP Framework see https://www.who.int/influenza/pip/en/ (16.02.2020). 
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(“Partnership Contribution”) which shall cover 50% of GISN’s running costs and be used for 
the enhancement of pandemic preparedness (WHO n.d.: 2). 
There are now two Standardised Material Transfer Agreements (SMTAs) that serve as ba-
sis for flu virus-sharing activities (see Krishnamurthy/Herder 2013: 280–283). The inclu-
sion of such SMTAs in the new framework was heavily disputed (Vezzani 2010: 681), with 
developing countries being strong proponents and the US being opposed (Irwin 2010). The 
outcome reflects the different positions on patent protection. The first SMTA relates to 
cooperation within GISRS. Neither the originating countries of virus samples nor laborato-
ries cooperating in GISRS will “obtain any intellectual property rights (IPRs) on the Materials 
[virus samples, UJ]” (Molenaar 2011a: 5). As for the second SMTA, vaccine and drug man-
ufacturers outside GISRS can choose between several benefit-sharing options through 
which they make their products accessible to everyone: They can donate 10% of current 
vaccine stockpiles to the WHO, or sell them at reasonable prices; they can issue royalty-
free licences to producers in developing countries, or they can provide royalty-free non-
exclusive licences on IPR to the WHO (Molenaar 2011a: 5). 
The PIP Framework represented a compromise in which all parties made significant con-
cessions (for the developing countries see Krishnamurthy/Herder 2013). Most countries 
involved in the negotiations welcomed the agreement on the PIP Framework. “The Indone-
sian delegate further noted that this global system is more equal and more transparent and 
that the Framework will contribute to increased preparedness” (Molenaar 2011a: 6). At 
least on paper there are significant changes compared to the old system of cooperation: 
The decades-old cooperation principle was reinforced, and in addition to that, benefit-shar-
ing was indeed established as a principle on an equal basis with that of virus-sharing. The 
protection of intellectual property rights was not abandoned, but modifications and com-
pensation were included in the agreement. One significant innovation was the fact that 
industry representatives openly acknowledged their responsibility to collaborate with WHO 
(Molenaar 2011a: 5). 
However, the PIP Framework is not a legally binding document and does not contain any 
enforcement provisions. To be implemented successfully, it depends on the cooperation 
of pharmaceutical companies and vaccine producers. Developed countries are under no 
obligation to contribute to a more equitable distribution of vaccines (Fidler/Gostin 2011: 
201).  
“Instead, the PIPF [PIP Framework, UJ] allows developed countries to shift the 
onus to manufacturers, calling on member states to ‘urge’ manufacturers to do-
nate pandemic and interpandemic vaccines, to make them more accessible to de-
veloping countries through tiered pricing and to engage in technology transfer” 
(Krishnamurthy/Herder 2013: 281).  
The implementation process started off difficult and slow (see Kamradt-Scott 2012: 4; 
Kamradt-Scott 2013), but the PIP Framework now seems to be working relatively effec-
tively (for a WHO perspective see Huvos/Khan 2016). For instance, as a WHO study re-
ported in 2018, “all current major influenza vaccine manufacturers have signed SMTA 2s 
with WHO” (WHO 2018: 18). Experts have commented positively on the Framework but 
have also pointed to remaining shortcomings, e.g. uncertainty regarding its ability to ensure 
benefit-sharing in case of an influenza pandemic (see Kamradt-Scott/Lee 2011: 839; 
Rourke 2019). Moreover, new conflicts arose with regard to virus-sharing and the protec-
tion of genetic resources. 
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5  NORM CONFLICTS AND LINKAGES IN THE CONTEXT OF VIRUS- AND BENEFIT-SHARING18 
As the previous sections demonstrated, pandemic influenza preparedness does not exist 
in isolation from other policy fields, even though cooperation in issues related to world 
health and global health governance is first and foremost based on the WHO Constitution. 
The Constitution postulates that the “enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being” (WHO 2020: 1). The right to 
health is thus a human right (UNHCR/WHO 2008) and was later established as part of the 
human security agenda (see Chen/Narasimhan 2003; Irwin 2010). Cooperation in GISN to 
advance influenza preparedness had been embedded in this broader normative framework 
and for decades functioned reasonably well, with the expectation that virus strains should 
be shared freely for the benefit of all and in order to improve global health. It is disputed 
among experts to what extent cooperation and virus-sharing represented legal obligations 
(Vezzani 2010: 677), though the arguments denying such a legal obligation seem more 
forceful (see Fidler 2008: 90). It seems clear, however, that there was a moral expectation 
of states to abide by its principle.19 This principle was reinforced by the WHO’s revised 
International Health Regulations which are binding on all WHO members and which explic-
itly include an obligation for members to cooperate if serious public health events arise 
(WHO 2008: 12 (IHR Art. 6 and 7)). There was and remains thus a solid normative basis for 
the expectation that viruses, and other pathogens, for that matter, should be shared for the 
sake of global health. 
However, over the past decades a new norm has evolved that stands in potential conflict 
with this expectation: access and benefit-sharing, i.e. the principle that benefits arising 
from the utilization of genetic resources of one country should be shared equitably be-
tween the origin country and the beneficiary. The claim to benefit-sharing did not only pose 
challenges for international health cooperation (see below). It also brought its proponents, 
mostly located in the Global South, into conflict with industrialised countries over intellec-
tual property rights as granted by the TRIPS Agreement. In the case of pandemic influenza 
preparedness, the dispute about the sharing of benefits and the protection of intellectual 
property rights concerned mainly antiviral drugs and flu vaccines. However, this is but one 
manifestation of the more general dispute between developing and developed countries 
about the exploitation of resources without adequate sharing of the benefits thus gained. 
In fact, the TRIPS Agreement had been challenged in the health realm before: The 2001 
Doha Declaration specified that TRIPS “does not and should not prevent members from 
taking measures to protect public health”20, and  
“[f]or the purposes of public health protection, the Doha Declaration accepted that 
the human right to essential medicines also formed a legitimate part of the world 
trade order. The promotion of public health was adopted as guiding precept in the 
interpretation and implementation of TRIPS. Most notably, restriction of the pro-
duction of compulsorily licensed medicines to the domestic market was relaxed 
(Wolf/Scholz 2017: 60). 
Intellectual property rights, as far as they apply to pharmaceutical and other health-related 
processes and products, have thus been modified for the benefit of global public health; 
the human right to health took precedence over intellectual property rights (see 
Wolf/Scholz 2017). The claims Indonesia and its supporters made in the pandemic influ-
                                                             
18  For a theoretical approach to norm linkages see e.g. Fehl 2018. 
19  David Fidler argues that the Indonesian sovereignty claim over H5N1 viruses isolated in its territory “cut 
against the ethos and practice of sample sharing under which GISN had operated” (Fidler 2008: 90). 
20  http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (14.01.2014). 
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enza case were probably informed by these developments. They provided a broader con-
text for the demand that benefit-sharing should be a mandatory component of any future 
virus-sharing regime. At the same time, some experts have voiced strong concerns that the 
access and benefit-sharing norm may have negative implications for global health prepar-
edness (see e.g. Ribeiro et al. 2018). 
The notion of benefit-sharing was already present in the 1993 Convention on Biodiversity 
(CBD) which contains as one of three core principles the “fair and equitable sharing of ben-
efits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources”.21 This principle has been elaborated 
and operationalized inter alia in the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and 
the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity. The Nagoya Protocol was concluded in 2010 after almost one dec-
ade of negotiations and entered into force in October 2014.22 It balances “appropriate ac-
cess to genetic resources and […] appropriate transfer of relevant technologies” with the 
“rights over those resources and to technologies”23, thus trying to reconcile claims to the 
sharing of genetic resources for the benefit of all, the widest possible access to relevant 
technologies, and the protection of (intellectual) property rights and genetic resources. To 
implement its provisions, states parties are required to enact national “legislative, admin-
istrative or policy measures on accessing sovereign genetic resources, as they choose” 
(Rourke et al. 2019: 7). This leaves members a certain leeway in interpreting the Protocol 
(see Ribeiro et al. 2018: 404). The CBD also stipulates that utilization of one country’s ge-
netic resources requires prior consent of and, if practicable, continuing cooperation with 
the country of origin (CBD Article 15).  
The question whether or not pathogens are covered by the CBD’s and the Nagoya Proto-
col’s definition of ‘genetic resources’ was contested among states and scholars when the 
PIP Framework was negotiated (see Fidler 2008: 90–91; Irwin 2010; UNCTAD 2014; Vez-
zani 2010: 678–679). By now, the interpretation that pathogens are ‘genetic resources’ in 
the Nagoya Protocol’s sense seems to have prevailed in discourse and in practice (see 
Cressey 2017; Nelson 2019; Srinivas 2017; Third World Network 2019). This does not mean 
that the norm conflict is resolved, however. To the contrary: If pathogens count as genetic 
resources to be protected by the Nagoya Protocol, their transfer requires prior individual 
agreements between origin and recipient state by default as stipulated by the Protocol. 
This may create challenges for international health cooperation and emergency response, 
which often depend on rapid and wide sharing of samples; it also complicates the scientific 
research processes more generally (see e.g. Cressey 2017; Nelson 2019; Ribeiro et al. 
2018; Smith et al. 2017).24 The negotiators of the Protocol took this into account when they 
included  “the importance of ensuring access to human pathogens for public health pre-
paredness and response purposes” in its preamble, and in Article 8 (b) obligated states 
parties to  
“[p]ay due regard to cases of present or imminent emergencies that threaten or 
damage human, animal or plant health, as determined nationally or internationally. 
Parties may take into consideration the need for expeditious access to genetic 
resources and expeditious fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the 
                                                             
21  http://www.cbd.int/intro/default.shtml (17.12.2013). 
22  Kanth 2013: 15; https://www.cbd.int/abs/ (04.12.2019). 
23  Nagoya Protocol, Article 1, http://www.cbd.int/abs/text/articles/default.shtml?sec=abs-01 (14.01.2014). 
24  For example, the annual process to develop an effective vaccine against the seasonal flu depends on the 
rapid sharing of information about the circulating strains to allow for the production of a matching vaccine in 
time for the next flu season. Experts fear that this process might be disrupted if individual agreements have 
to be negotiated under the Nagoya Protocol for these viruses (see Cressey 2017). 
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use of such genetic resources, including access to affordable treatments by those 
in need, especially in developing countries.” 
Moreover, Article 4(4) includes a provision that exempts “specialized international access 
and benefit-sharing instrument[s]” from the Nagoya Protocol’s requirements. The PIP 
Framework could arguably represent such an instrument (see Saez 2017; Srinivas 2017). 
However, despite these concessions, there remains a tension between the protection of 
genetic resources and the sharing of pathogens and samples for global health purposes.  
In 2016, the WHO Secretariat published a study that analyses the implications of the Na-
goya Protocol for public health (WHO 2016). This study concluded that the Nagoya Proto-
col’s provisions may have negative effects on the speed and extent of pathogen-sharing. 
However, if implemented comprehensively, it may also foster global health cooperation 
since it provided a stable framework of expectations and incentives regarding pathogen- 
and benefit-sharing practices (WHO 2016). A second report submitted in 2019 remains 
vague in its assessment of the actual practical implications but emphasises the need for 
national implementation that allows and facilitates the timely sharing of pathogens for the 
sake of global health (WHO 2019a).25 The WHO regularly consults with the CBD Secretariat 
on this issue26, and in May 2019 the World Health Assembly (WHA) requested the Director-
General to “provide information on current pathogen-sharing practices and arrangements, 
the implementation of access and benefit-sharing measures, as well as the potential public 
health outcomes and other implications” and to provide another report to the WHA in 
2021.27 The norm conflict, while as yet unresolved, is thus openly acknowledged and re-
flected in the every-day business of the WHO.  
 
6  CONCLUSION 
By ceasing cooperation in the established framework of virus-sharing, by forcing other 
states to re-negotiate that framework, and by adding benefit-sharing as integral part to this 
normative system, Indonesia initiated a substantial reorganisation of the existing system 
of pandemic influenza preparedness – a policy field that is very specific yet of major global 
public health concern. Indonesia’s success was a function of different variables. The facts 
that there were major concerns at the time that an influenza pandemic might be imminent 
and that the virus strain circulating in Indonesia was considered key in the efforts to pre-
vent this pandemic provided a window of opportunity and gave Indonesia disproportionate 
leverage in the process. Moreover, by invoking long-standing grievances over the exploita-
tion of the Global South by the Global North in public health and other realms, Indonesia 
could garner broad support for its stance among developing countries. Finally, through ty-
ing its vision for a reformed virus- and benefit-sharing system to the broader emerging 
norm complex of benefit-sharing and the protection of genetic resources, Indonesia an-
chored its claims in a wider normative context.  
The normative shift entailed in the renegotiation process for the PIP Framework is not lim-
ited to pandemic influenza preparedness: The intertwining of global health, access and 
benefit-sharing, and the protection of genetic resources is now manifest in global health 
                                                             
25  For a critical view of the WHO assessment see e.g. GISAID 2019. For a more negative assessment of the 
implications of the Nagoya protocol on global health and research see e.g. Knauf et al. 2019. 
26  https://www.who.int/departments/science-division/public-health-implications-of-implementation-of-the-na-
goya-protocol (12.12.2019). 
27  See WHA 72(13), 28 May, 2019, http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA72/A72(13)-en.pdf 
(12.12.2019). 
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politics on a larger scale (see WHO 2016; WHO 2019b). Recent debates in the World Health 
Assembly illustrate this: Reportedly “developed countries mainly focused on the impact of 
the Nagoya Protocol on pathogen sharing, especially expressing concerns over delay in 
sharing samples” (Third World Network 2019). At the same time, “developing countries 
strongly supported the objectives and principles of the CBD and the Nagoya protocol, see-
ing the latter as an opportunity for equity globally, through fair and equitable benefit sharing 
which in turn will reinforce public health preparedness and response during an emergency” 
(Third World Network 2019).  
This norm conflict is exacerbated by technological developments, particularly in genetic 
engineering. Due to major technological advances, genetic sequencing nowadays plays a 
much bigger role in the surveillance, detection and diagnosis of infectious diseases as well 
as in research into remedies and countermeasures. Often a gene sequence rather than the 
whole pathogen is used in the research nowadays. Genetic sequence data thus assume a 
similar role as pathogen samples used to play, raising the same problem: If genetic se-
quence data are shared without regulation, and if benefits are gained from these se-
quences in countries other than the country of origin, the international community would 
be back at square one in terms of balancing the sharing of viruses (i.e. their genetic se-
quences) and benefits. Consequently, in a review of the PIP Framework in 2016 the Review 
Group included in its recommendations the proposal that genetic sequences should be 
treated like actual virus samples under the PIP Framework; this has not (yet) been imple-
mented, however (Saez 2017; WHO 2016a; WHO 2018). Likewise, the question to what ex-
tent genetic sequences are or should be covered by the Nagoya Protocol is still subject to 
debate (Branswell 2019; Nelson 2019; Rourke et al. 2019: 9–10; Ribeiro et al. 2018: 404; 
WHO 2018 20–22). Genetic sequencing thus adds yet another contested layer to the norm 
complex. A theoretical analysis of this complex, its evolution and its current dynamics is 
beyond the scope of this paper but would merit future research – as would the considera-
tion how these norm conflicts and contestations play out in global health more generally 
and in other policy fields.28 
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